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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Sunnyside industrial & Professional Park, L.L.C. ("SiPP") is an ldaho limited liability company. 
Sunnyside Park Utiiities, inc. ("Sunnyside Utiiities") is  an idaho corporation. SiPP and Sunnyside Utilities 
(collectively "Sunnyside") each have their principle place of business in Bonneviiie County, Idaho. SiPP is 
developing a 77 acre parcel of commercial property in Bonneviiie County, idaho. Sunnyside Utilities 
provides sewer and water services to some of the developed iots in the 77 acre parcel. (R. p. 101). 
in 1996, SIPP obtained a permit from Respondent, Eastern ldaho Public Health District, formerly 
known as District Seven Health Department ("D7HD1'), for construction of the first phase of a central 
septic system to serve the subdivision. See Agency Record, Petitioners' Exhibit C. D7HD inspected the 
construction of the central septic system on August 23,1996 and determined that the septic system 
construction was in substantial compliance with approved plans and specifications and that the facilities 
complied with the regulatory standards in effect at the time of facility construction. See Agency Record, 
Petitioners' Exhibit D. D7HD approved plans for a subdivision application on July 30, 1999, which 
included a central septic system, and lifted ail sanitary restrictions. See Agency Record, Respondent's 
Exhibit 3. SiPP relied on such inspections and approvals to develop the property and began selling 
multiple lots to third-party owners. in 2002, Sunnyside Utilities was formed and began providing, and 
continues to provide, sewer and water service to multiple iots in the subdivision. (R. p. 7-8). 
In June of 2006, Sunnyside Utiiities' septic system was temporarily overloaded by the illegal and 
excessive discharges by the tenant occupying one parcel in the subdivision. (R. p. 8). Pursuant to an 
approved permit, Sunnyside Utilities expanded i ts  septic system and resolved the temporary overload. 
However, D7HD then unilaterally and without authority decided to require that the newly expanded 
septic system be abandoned and replaced by either a large soil absorption system ("LSAS") or a 
connection to the City of ldaho Falls' wastewater treatment facilities. After failing to reach an 
agreement with Sunnyside for installation of an LSAS or connection to the City, D7HD decided to impose 
sanctions against Sunnyside by issuing a certificate of disapproval and reimposing sanitary restrictions 
on the entire subdivision. See Agency Record, Document 13. However, authority to reimpose sanitary 
restrictions on a central septic system was not delegated to D7HD and i ts officers and directors cleariy 
knew that they were acting without any basis in law or fact. (R. p. 107). 
D7HD's jurisdiction over private septic systems is derived solely from the Memorandum of 
Understanding ("MOU") between D7HD and the Idaho Department of Environmental Quality. (R. p. 15). 
Under the MOU, DEQ retained authority to "[alpprove plans and specifications, and provide written 
comments to Districts on central systems ...." (R. p. 23). D7HD is only delegated authority to "[tlake 
appropriate action to enforce Individual/Subsurface Sewage Disposal Rules." (R. p. 23). Initially, 
"[slanitary restrictions were lifted by D7HD on the basis of a 'Central Septic' system." See Agency 
Record, Respondent's Exhibit 3, emphasis added. Since Sunnyside's septic system has always been a 
central system, it falls under the sole jurisdiction of DEQ, and no regulatory authority was delegated to 
D7HD. (R. p. 23). The MOU establishes that "when re-imposition of sanitaw restrictions is required, the 
responsible agency should act." (R. p. 20, emphasis added). In spite of the complete lack of regulatoiy 
authority, D7HD unilaterally and arbitrarily proceeded to reimpose sanitary restrictions on Sunnyside 
because DEQ was "sitting on it." See Testimony of D7HD Director Richard Horne, Transcript of January 
25,2007 Hearing, p. 38, In. 19-23. 
Sunnyside appealed the reimposition of sanitary restrictions to the District Director, Richard 0. 
Horne, who upheld the restriction reimposition. See Agency Record, Document 9. Mr. Horne usurped 
authority rightly retained by DEQ and sought to justify the assumption of power by including a caveat 
that his decision would stand "unless written documentation is submitted to us by DEQasking us not to 
re-impose sanitary restrictions ...." See Agency Record, Document 9. Such a statement does not create 
any jurisdiction where clearly none existed. Mr. Horne knew that "DEQ is the responsible party for 
approving plans and specifications on central systems as defined in the rules." See Agency Record, 
Document 9. At a later hearing before the District Board of Health, Mr. Horne personally acknowledged 
that "central systems are the responsibility of DEQ. They always have been." See Transcript of January 
25, 2007 hearing, pg. 38, In. 19-20. As a further violation of Sunnyside's due process rights, Mr. Horne's 
decision was based upon a "Corrected" Notice of Intent to Re-Impose Sanitary Restrictions, which was 
issued after completion of the appeal hearing. See Agency Record, Document 9. 
Sunnyside appealed the Director's decision to the D7HD Board of Health, which upheld the 
reimposition of sanitary restrictions. See Transcript of June 21, 2007 Hearing, p. 63, In. 6-17. However, 
multiple members of the Board acknowledged on the record that only DEQ had jurisdiction over 
Sunnyside Utilities' central sewer system. (R. p. 107). The following comments were made by some 
board members: 
Commissioner Robinson: "I think it should be now turned back to DEQ ... and let them handle it. 
They're more equipped to handle the large ones than the small ones." SeeTranscript of June 
21, 2007 Hearing, pg. 37, in. 8-13. 
Commissioner Radford: "I guess I'd like to modify our decision that we give it to DEQ because 
this problem's become a DEQ problem. So, I'd like to modify our previous decision that we 
made to give this size of a system to DEQ ... When it gets to these other kinds - I think even the 
Director - I've heard him say before that DEQ- that's what a memorandum of understanding is 
for. That's who ought to be doing this ... l think it's incumbent upon us to modify our decision 
and say this system has become so large that it's out of our expertise as a District of Health." 
SeeTranscript of June 21,2007 Hearing, pg. 45, In. 13-17, pg. 46, in. 21-24 and pg. 55, in. 20-23. 
Doctor Barbara Nelson, M.D.: "I thought that from the first hearing, that this should be decided 
by DEQ ...[ 11s there any way we can make a decision to turn it over to DEQ ..." See Transcript of 
June 21,2007 Hearing, pg. 39, In. 17-18 and pg. 39, In. 25 though pg. 40, In. 2. 
In the end, the Board of Health decided "to uphold the sanitary restrictions and to encourage the 
applicant to  work with DEQ to remedy the situation." See Transcript of June 21,2007 Hearing, pg. 60, 
In. 20-22 (emphasis added). The Board clearly recognized that it did not have jurisdiction over 
Sunnyside's central system, yet claimed authority to reimpose sanitary restrictions. (R. p. 107). The 
MOU clearly states that "when re-imposition of sanitary restrictions is required, the responsible agency 
should act." (R. p. 20, emphasis added). DEQ was the agency responsible for central systems when 
sanitary restrictions were reimposed. 
Having exhausted i ts administrative remedies, Sunnyside then filed a civil action, combining a 
Petition for Declaratory Judgment regarding D7HD jurisdiction and a request for Judicial Review, in the 
event jurisdiction was found, with the Seventh Judiciai District Court for Bonneville County. (R. p. 5). In 
the District Court's Memorandum Decision and Order, Judge Joel Tingey determined that D7HD acted 
without authority and that ail of D7HD's actions were void. (R. p. 100). Judge Tingey held that "effective 
in 2001 the statute [governing reimposition of sanitary restrictions (Idaho Code § SO-1326)l was 
amended to place such authority with DEQ." (R. p. 105). Based upon this amendment, "the authority to 
reimpose sanitary restrictions through the 'issuance of a certificate of disapproval' rested with DEQ." (R. 
p. 105). Although "a public health district is granted a general power and duty to 'do al l  things required 
for the preservation and protection of the public health ...' (I.C. 5 39-414(2)), such a general statement 
can not be considered to grant authority over matters specifically assigned to DEQ." (R. p. 105). Judge 
Tingey also ruled that "at all times relevant the septic system utilized by [Sunnyside] fell within the 
definition of a central system." (R. p. 106). Therefore, "[tlhere is nothing under Section II B of the MOU 
suggesting that the health districts are given authority over central systems or specifically, authority to 
reimpose sanitary restrictions as to a central system." (R. p. 107). Judge Tingey further noted "that 
statements made by District Seven personnel. . . indicate an understanding and acknowledgement that 
DEQ has retained . . . control over central systems." (R. p. 107). D7HD had no authority and it is clear 
from the record that D7HD Director, employees and Board members all knew that it lacked any 
authority to reimpose sanitary restrictions on Sunnyside. 
Having obtained the desired declaratory judgment relief, making Judicial Review unnecessary, 
Sunnyside filed a Motion for Attorney Fees pursuant to Idaho Code Sections 12-117 and 12-121. (R. p. 
112-12). After finding that Sunnyside was the prevailing party and D7HD knowingly acted without 
authority, Judge Tingey awarded costs to Sunnyside but denied both the Motion for Attorney Fees and a 
Motion for Reconsideration. (R. p. 164 and 200-1). On the Motion for Attorney Fees, Judge Tingey 
denied ldaho Code Section 12-117 fees on the basis that D7HD was not a 'state agency.' (R. p. 165). 
Judge Tingey further ruled that D7HD acted with a reasonable basis because the septic tank was 
overflowing and that would be a public health concern prompting some kind of action. (R. p. 165-66). 
Judge Tingey also ruled that the "matter was not brought, pursued or defended frivolously, 
unreasonably, or without foundation" as required t o  award fees under ldaho Code Section 12-121. (R. 
p. 167). in the Memorandum Decision and Order on Motion for Reconsideration, Judge Tingey upheld 
his previous Order that D7HD was not a 'state agency' and further ruled that a Petition for Declaratory 
Judgment and Judicial Review did not qualify as a 'civil action' necessary t o  recover attorney fees under 
ldaho Code Section 12-121. (R. p. 200-1 - 200-4). Sunnyside now appeals these denials t o  the Supreme 
Court o f  ldaho and also seeks attorney fees on appeal. This appeal addresses Sunnyside's entitlement to 
attorney fees, not the amount to be awarded. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
I. 
Is Sunnyside entitled to attorney fees against District Seven Health Department pursuant to 
ldaho Code 5 12-117? 
II. 
Is Sunnyside entitled to attorney fees against District Seven Health Department pursuant t o  
ldaho Code 5 12-121? 
111. 
Is Sunnyside entitled to attorney fees on appeal as prevailing party? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Since 1999, Idaho's Supreme Court has applied a de novo or free review standard when 
reviewing I.C. 5 12-117 cases. Rincover v. State, Dept. of Finance, 132 ldaho 547,549,976 P.2d 473 
(1999); see also In Re Estate of Elliott, 141 ldaho 177,183 (2005). The "Court has the constitutional and 
statutory obligation ultimately to determine the law in any proceeding brought to the Court for Review." 
Rincover V. State, Dept. of Finance, 132 ldaho a t  550. Further, "[tlhe Court is  not bound by the district 
court's decision as to whether, as a matter of law, the activities of an agency or other enumerated 
governmentalentity had a 'reasonable basis in ... [the] law' so as to satisfy the predicate for an award of 
attorney fees pursuant to the statute." Id. at 550 (emphasis added), 
Concerning I.C. 5 12-121, "a decision to award attorney fees is reviewed under the abuse of 
discretion standard." Stout v. Key Training Corp. 144 ldaho 195,196,158 P.3d 971 (2007)(citing 
Contreras v. Rubley, 142 ldaho 573,576, 130 P.3d 1111,1114 (2006)). "However, when an award of 
attorney fees depends on the interpretation of a statute, the standard of review for statutory 
interpretation applies." Id. "The interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which [the] Court 
exercises free review." 144 ldaho a t  196 (citing Carrier v. Lake Pend Oreille Sch. Dist. #84, 142 ldaho 
804,807,134 P.3d 655,658 (2006)). 
ARGUMENT 
1. SUNNYSIDE SHOULD RECOVER ATTORNEY FEES AGAINST DISTRICT SEVEN HEALTH 
DEPARTMENT PURSUANT TO IDAHO CODE 5 12-117. 
Sunnyside should recover attorney fees from D7HD because ldaho statute entitles a prevailing 
party to attorney fees if a state agency acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. ldaho Code § 12- 
117(1) reads as follows: 
Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any administrative or civil judicial proceeding involving 
as adverse parties a state agency, a city, a county or other taxing district and a person, the court 
shall award the prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees and reasonable 
expenses, if the court finds that the party against whom the judgment is rendered acted without 
a reasonable basis in fact or law. 
In Bogner v. State Dep't of Revenue and Taxation, the Court found that the purpose of I.C. 5 12-117 is 
two-fold: "(1) to serve as a deterrent to groundless or arbitrary agency action; and (2) to provide a 
remedy for persons who have borne unfair and unjustified financial burdens defending against 
groundless charges or attempting to correct mistakes agencies never should ha[ve] made." 107 ldaho 
854,859,693 P.2d 1056 (1984). In Rincover v. State, Dept of Finance, the Court "noted that I.C. § 12- 
117 is not a discretionary statute; but it provides that the court shall award attorney fees where the 
state agency did not act with a reasonable basis in fact or law ...." 132 ldaho at 549 (emphasis added). 
In order for Sunnyside to receive attorney fees under I.C. 5 12-117, the Court must answer three 
questions. First, was Sunnyside the prevailing party? Second, is D7HD a 'state agency' for purposes of 
I.C. 5 12-117? Third, did D7HD act without a reasonable basis in fact or law? If all three questions are 
answered affirmatively, then an award of attorney fees to Sunnyside is mandatory. 
a. Was Sunnyside the prevailing party? 
The District Court held that D7HD acted without authority and that all D7HD's actions were void. 
See Memorandum Decision and Order, p. 9 (R. p. 108). This decision has not been challenged by D7HD. 
In a subsequent order, the District Court specifically held that "the Court considers [Sunnyside] to be the 
prevailing party in this matter." Memorandum Decision and Order on Motion for Costs and Attorney 
Fees, p. 1 (R. p. 164). It is clear that Sunnyside was the prevailing party, having obtained the Declaratory 
Judgment relief sought, avoiding any need for Judicial Review. 
b. Is D7HD a 'state agency' for purposes of I.C. 5 12-117? 
The District Court relied upon I.C. 5 39-401 to hold that it was the "legislative intent ... that health 
districts were not state agencies." Memorandum Decision and Order on Motion for Costs and Attorney 
Fees, p. 2 (R. p. 165). In a single convoluted passage the legislature completely contradicts itself when it 
claims that "[ilt is legislative intent that health districts operate and be recognized not as state agencies 
or departments, but as governmental entities whose creation has been authorized by the state ....'I 
ldaho Code 5 39-401. However, the legislature identifies only one purpose for not calling the health 
districts a 'state agency,' which is to exempt the districts "from the required participation in the services 
of the purchasing agent or employee liability coverage, as rendered by the department of 
administration." Id. Nowhere in the statute does the legislature exempt the health districts from having 
to pay attorney fees resulting for acting without a reasonable basis in law or fact, or from the application 
of I.C. 5 12-117 specifically. 
ldaho Code 5 12-117(4)(b) states that "For purposes of this section: 'State agency' shall mean 
any agency as defined in Section 67-5201, ldaho Code." (Emphasis added). Case law supports reliance 
upon 5 67-5201 in determining whether an entity is classified as a 'state agency'. See Bott v. ldaho State 
Bldg. Authority, 122 ldaho 471,479,835 P.2d 1282 (1992); Fox v. Board of County Com'rs, 121 ldaho 
686,692,827 P.2d 699 (1991). ldaho Code 5 67-5201(2) defines an agency as'leach state board, 
commission, department or officer authorized by law to make rules or to determine contested cases ...." 
(Emphasis added). D7HD qualifies under both categories as a 'state agency' because it is authorized by 
law to make rules and is empowered to determine contested cases. 
ldaho Code 5 39-416, entitled 'Rules Adopted by District Board', states that "[tlhe district board 
by the affirmative vote of a majority of its members may adopt, amend or rescind rules and standards as 
it deems necessary t o  carry out the purposes and provisions of [Idaho Code 55 39-408 - 39-414,39-415 
- 39-423, 39-4261.'' D7HD had expressly admitted that "public heath districts ... have rule making 
authority of their own. idaho Code 55 39-413 and 39-416." (R. p. 84). 
ldaho Code 5 39-417, entitled 'Hearings by District Board', allows that any alleged violator o f  the 
district board's rules may "seek a hearing before the district board." Section 39-417 further states that 
"the district board or its agent shall have the same powers and authority set out i n  subsection (3) of 
section 39-107, ldaho Code." ldaho Code Section 39-107(3) sets forth the authority that the ldaho 
Department of Environmental Quality, a state agency, has been granted t o  further its duties. This 
authority includes "the power to administer oaths, certify to official acts, and t o  issue subpoenas for the 
attendance of witnesses and the production of papers, books, accounts, documents and testimony." 
Idaho Code 5 39-107(3). Although D7HD lacks jurisdiction over central septic systems, when D7HD is 
within its jurisdiction, it is empowered both t o  issue rules and hear contested cases, meeting all o f  the 
definitional requirements of a state agency required by both ldaho Code 55 12-117 and 67-S201(2). 
ldaho courts have addressed on several occasions whether an entity is a 'state agency' under I.C. 
5 12-117, unfortunately the courts have not  addressed District Health Departments specifically. In 8ot t  
v. ldaho State Bldg. Authority, one factor that the Court said should be considered is the name o f  the 
entity. 122 ldaho 471,479,835 P.2d 1282 (1992). D7HD reimposed sanitary restrictions, using the 
D7HD letterhead, on November 28,2006. (R. p. 30). D7HD changed its name in January, 2007, after the 
reimposition complained o f  had already occurred. See generally R. p. 47 (dated January 25,2007, the 
letter from Mark Trupp carries the Eastern ldaho Public Health District letterhead: "Upon deliberation o f  
Eastern ldaho Public Health District's (i.e. District Seven Health Department) Board of Health...."). At the 
beginning of this civil action, Eastern ldaho Public Health District was actually called District Seven 
Health Department. Further, the first line in ldaho Code 5 39-409 says "[tlhere is hereby created and 
established in each of the ...p ublic health districts a district health department." ldaho Code 5 39-409 
(emphasis added). ldaho Code 5 39-410 states that "[tlhere is hereby created and established in each of 
the public health districts a district board of health ...." ldaho Code 5 39-410 (emphasis added). The 
terms 'department' and 'board' are two of the four descriptive words included in I.C. 5 67-5201(2) to 
identify a state agency. The term 'district'simply refers to the Eastern ldaho geographical area that is 
served, and is not a descriptive characteristic of the entity itself. Changing the name does not change 
the fact that D7HD qualifies as a 'state agency' for I.C. 5 12-117 purposes, being both a board and a 
department. 
The broad reach o f  I.C. 12-117 is further noted in Rincover v. Stote, Dept. of Finance, where the 
court applies the section to "the activities of an agency or other enumerated governmentcrl entity ...." 
132 ldaho 547,550,976 P.2d 473 (1999) (emphasis added). Although the legislature created an 
exemption from one expressly enumerated state agency requirement by claiming that D7HD was not a 
state agency, the legislature still recognized that D7HD is a "governmental entit[y] whose creation has 
been authorized by the state." ldaho Code 5 39-401. 
ldaho courts have held that "when two governmental promulgations are in  irreconcilable 
conflict, the one enacted later in time governs.'' Mickelsen v. City of Rexburg, 101  ldaho 305,307, 612 
P.2d 542 (1980). Further, "it is established that a specific statute will control over a general statute 
when the two are in conflict." Id. at 307. Not only is ldaho Code 5 12-117 more specific than 5 39-401 
by expressly stating what will be classified as a state agency for purposes o f  assessing attorney fees, it is 
also more recent in both enactment and amendment. ldaho Code 5 39-401 was enacted in 1976 and 
amended in 1986, whereas ldaho Code 5 12-117 was enacted in 1984 and most recently amended in 
2000. 
D7HD is trying to carve itself into an exception where i t  can claim the benefits of being a state 
agency, but avoid the liabilities attendant to that agency status. Although, as Judge Tingey pointed out, 
"[tlhe proper characterization of a health district is not readily apparent from ldaho case or statutory 
law", See Memorandum Decision and Order, p. 2 (R. p. 165), D7HD qualifies as a 'state agency' for the 
purposes of I.C. 5 12-117 and should not be exempt from accountability for knowingly acting beyond its 
jurisdiction. The issue is whether D7HD falls under the necessary requirements promulgated by I.C. 5 
12-117, regardless of what the legislature chooses t o  call the department and its board. If it waddles 
like a duck, smells like a duck, and quacks like a duck, the legislature cannot call it an eagle to avoid 
hunting season. D7HD was created like a state agency, enacts rules like a state agency, hears contested 
cases like a state agency and cannot avoid ldaho Code 5 12-117 by calling itself a district. 
c. Did D7HD act without a reasonable basis in fact o r  law? 
ldaho case law directly holds that "where a state agency had no authority t o  order a particular 
action, it acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law." Lockhart v. Dept. of Fish and Game, 121 ldaho 
894,898,828 P.2d 1299 (1992) (citing Moosman v. Idaho Horse Racing Comm'n, 117 ldaho 949,793 
P.2d 181 (1990)). 
The District Court found "that authority t o  reimpose sanitary restrictions was statutorily granted 
t o  DEQ, and not to public health districts directly." See Memorandum Decision and Order, p. 6 (R. p. 
105). The District Court also found that under the Memorandum o f  Understanding between D7HD and 
the ldaho Department o f  Environmental Quality, "DEQ reserved authority t o  approve plans and 
specifications for [Sunnyside's system]." Id, at p. 7 (R. p. 106). The District Court further found that "it is 
clear under the MOU that there is no intent for there to be a duplication or overlap of authority 
between DEQ and the health districts t o  reimpose sanitary restriction." Id. at p. 8 (R. p. 107). The 
District Court expressly ruled that "District Seven's issuance of a Certificate o f  Disapproval and its 
reimposition o f  sanitary restrictions on the subject property were without authority." Id. at p. 9 (R. p. 
108). The District Court also explicitly found that "statements made by District Seven personnel as 
contained in the Agency Record indicate an understanding and acknowledgement that DEQ has retained 
such control over central systems." Id. at p. 8 (R. p. 107). D7HD acted without authority, and absolutely 
understood that absence of authority before it acted. Id. a t  p. 8 (R. p. 107). D7HD has not challenged 
these holdings. 
However, the District Court acted inconsistently when Judge Tingey ruled that he "does not 
believe that the actions of [D7HD] were without a reasonable basis in fact or law." See Memorandum 
Decision and Order on Motion for Costs and Attorney Fees, p. 2 (R. p. 165). Judge Tingey relied on the 
premise that "Petitioner's septic tank was overflowing causing sewage to pool on the surface of the 
property ... creatling] a public health concern reasonably prompting some action on the part of [D7HD]." 
Id. at p. 2-3 (R. p. 165-166). "Some action" did not include reimposition of sanitary restrictions on the 
entire subdivision. This is strikingly similar to what occurred in In re Estate of Elliott: 
In ruling from the bench on the personal representative's request for attorney fees, the district 
court noted that, "[slo although I ruled in the [personal representative's] favor and although I 
found that the State action was without a basis in law, as did [the magistrate judge], I do not 
find that the action was so unreasonable or crossed that broad canyon that I think is required in 
12-117." The district court found that the Department's actions were without a basis in law but 
were not unreasonable. This determination is inconsistent considering the circumstances of the 
case. 
141 Idaho 177,184, 108 P.3d 324 (2005). The Elliott Appellate Court concluded that because the 
"Department acted without statutory authority. . . [its] actions in this case were unreasonable and 
without a basis in law." Id. at 184. Based upon this finding, "I.C. 5 12-117 required the district court to 
award attorney fees where the Department's actions were brought without a basis in law." Id. a t  184 
(emphasis added). As in the present case, "[tlhe district court correctly perceived the law but failed to 
properly apply I.C. (5 12-1171.'' Id. at 184. This Appellate Court should similarly hold that Judge Tingey 
ruled inconsistently in denying Sunnyside's attorney fee request and that D7HD, acting without 
authority to reimpose sanitary restrictions, acted without a reasonable basis in law. 
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2. SUNNYSIDE SHOULD RECOVER ATTORNEY FEES AGAINST DISTRICT SEVEN HEALTH 
DEPARTMENT PURSUANTTO IDAHO CODE 5 12-121 
Under ldaho Code 5 12-121, "[iln any civil action, the judge may award reasonable attorney's 
fees to the prevailing party or parties ...." However, the ldaho Rules of Civil Procedure limit attorney's 
fees to actions that are "brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without 
foundation." See I.R.C.P. Rule 54(e). If the Court finds that this is a civil action and that D7HD acted 
unreasonably or without foundation, Sunnyside is entitled to attorney's fees under I.C. 5 12-121. 
a. Is a Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Judicial Review a 'Civil Action'? 
ldaho courts have concluded that "an appeal from an agency decision ... is not a civil action . . . 
commenced by filing a complaint with the court." State v. Christensen, 131 ldaho 138,142,953 P.2d 
578 (1998). However, the ldaho Supreme Court has expressly left open the possibility that a petition for 
declaratory relief could be treated as a complaint and qualify as a civil action. 131 ldaho at 143. 
Unfortunately the Christensen Court did not rule on whether a declaratory judgment action qualifies for 
§ 12-121 relief, holding that attorney fees would not be appropriate when addressing an area of the law 
(statutory interpretation of chapter 13, title 50 of the ldaho Code) that was not well settled. Id. at 143. 
In the very recent case of Highlands Development Corp. v. City of Boise, Docket No. 33174 (ldaho 
6-18-2008), the ldaho Supreme Court acknowledged that a civil action for declaratory judgment can be 
combined with a separate Petition for Judicial Review. Id. at p. 6, n.2. This is exactly what was done by 
Sunnyside in the present civil action, although no Judicial Review ever occurred. 
In this action, Judge Tingey ruled that "[rlegardless of how a petition or complaint may be styled 
or named, the dispositive question is whether the action is an appeal from an administrative matter." 
See Memorandum Decision and Order on Motion for Reconsideration, p. 3 (R. p. 200-3). This is an 
erroneous interpretation, as ldaho Appellate Courts have held that the 'dispositive question' is whether 
the proceedings can be classified as a civil action commenced by filing a complaint with the court. State 
v. Christensen, 131 ldaho at 138. In Lowery v. Board of County Com'rs the court explained that the 
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Bogner v. State Dept. of Revenue and Tax ruling allowed attorney fees if a party filed a complaint against 
an administrative ruling, rather than simply an appeal. 117 ldaho 1079, 1082,793 P.2d 1251 (1990). 
The District Court here incorrectly held that "the action initiated by [Sunnyside], regardless of its 
label, was an appeal of an administrative decision." See Memorandum Decision and Order on Motion 
for Reconsideration, p. 4 (R. p. 200-4). Sunnyside's petition sought declaratory judgment regarding the 
extent of D7HD's authority. Attorney fees are not allowed in an action that is purely an administrative 
appeal, but are allowed if a complaint is filed against an administrative ruling pursuant to ldaho Rules of 
Civil Procedure 3(a). Id. a t  1082. Under ldaho Rules of Civil Procedure 3(a)(l), "[a] civil action is 
commenced by the filing of a complaint with the court, which may be denominated as a complaint, 
petition, or application ...." (Emphasis added). It is not necessary that the pleading be called a 
complaint. 
This Court must determine that a petition for declaratory judgment, although combined with a 
request for judicial review, is correctly classified as a civil action. The Christensen Court recognized the 
potential of allowing I.C. 5 12-121 attorney fees for exactly such a situation, but did not give an answer. 
131 ldaho at 143. Sunnyside requests that this Court hold that a declaratory judgment action addressing 
the extent of D7HD's jurisdiction is a civil action under lRCP 3(a) and ldaho Code Section 12-121. This i s  
particularly true when the declaratory judgment avoids the need for the Judicial Review. The result in 
this case would be exactly the same if only a declaratory judgment action had been filed. 
b. Did D7HD defend frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation? 
ldaho Rules of Civil Procedure 54(e)(l) states that "attorney fees under section 12-121, ldaho 
Code, may be awarded by the court only when it finds, from the facts presented to it, that the case was 
brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation." "An award of attorney 
fees under ldaho Code 5 12-121 is not a matter of right to the prevailing party, but is appropriate only 
when the court, in its discretion, is left with the abiding belief that the case was brought, pursued, or 
defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation." McGrew v. McGrew, 139 ldaho 551, 562, 82 
P.3d 833,844 (2003). "Ordinarily, attorney fees will not be awarded where the losing party brought the 
appeal in good faith and where a genuine issue of law was presented." In Re Twin Falls County Comm. 
Resolution No. 2001-4,139 ldaho 131, 136,75 P.3d 185 (2003). "It is not [the appellate court's] function 
on appeal of an award of attorney fees under I.C. § 12-121 and I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l) to engage in fact 
finding ...[ the appellate court's] function is to review the trial court's finding to determine if i t  is 
supported by the record." Sun Valley Shopping Ctr. v. ldaho Power, 119 ldaho 87,92,803 P.2d 993 
(1990). 
As noted in Section 1(C), supra, the District Court held that D7HD acted without statutory 
authority when the Department and its Board of Health reimposed sanitary restrictions on Sunnyside. 
ldaho case law clearly holds that "where a state agency had no authority to order a particular action, it 
acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law." Lockhart v. Dept. of Fish and Game, 121 ldaho 894, 
898,828 P.2d 1299 (1992) (citing Moosman v. ldaho Horse Racing Camm'n, 117 ldaho 949,793 P.2d 181 
(1990)). Judge Tingey abused his discretion when he found that D7HD did not defend unreasonably or 
without foundation. D7HD knew it lacked all authority to reimpose sanitary restrictions against 
Sunnyside and any attempt to assert authority that D7HD knew it did not have was unreasonable and 
without foundation. It should not be found reasonable for a state agency to defend an action that is 
acknowledged by i ts Board Members and Director to be outside the authority of the state agency. 
3. SUNNYSIDE SHOULD RECOVER ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
In Spidell v. Jenkins, the ldaho Court of Appeals addressed attorney fees on appeal and ruled 
that "[wlhen an appeal concerns attorney fees alone, such an award will be made to the prevailing party 
if the issue on appeal includes the entitlement to a fee award below and is not limited to the amount." 
111 ldaho 857, 861, 727 P.2d 1285 (Ct. App. 1986)(citing DeWlls Interiors, Inc. v. Dines, 106 ldaho 288, 
678 P.2d 80 (Ct. App. 1984)). 
In the present case, the sole issue on appeal is Sunnyside's entitlement t o  attorney fees, not the 
amount. Under Idaho Code 55 12-117 and 12-121, as prevailing party Sunnyside should also be awarded 
attorney fees on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
The two-fold purpose of ldaho Code T, 12-117 is: "(1) to serve as a deterrent to groundless or 
arbitrary agency action; and (2) to provide a remedy for persons who have borne unfair and unjustified 
financial burdens defending against groundless charges or attempting to correct mistakes agencies 
should never ha[ve] made." Bogner v. State Dept. of Revenue and Tax, 107 ldaho 854,859,693 P.2d 
1056 (1984). Further, "[tlhe clear purpose of [I.C. 5 12-1211. . . is to reimburse the successful party for 
legal fees incurred in prosecuting his or her legal rights." Id. a t  858 (citing Minich v. Gem State 
Developers, 99 ldaho 911,918,591 P.2d 1078,1085 (1979)). In Bogner, the ldaho Supreme Court found 
"nothing in § 12-121 which establishes that the legislature intended to deny awards of attorney's fees 
for costs incurred in pursuing an administrative remedy prior to instigating the very civil action which 
necessarily resulted when that effort failed." Id. at 858. Allowing D7HD to fall into some middle no 
man's land where the department is immune from either statute would frustrate the very purpose of 
holding state agencies accountable for their mistakes. Since the District Court determined that D7HD 
knew it lacked any authority to act against Sunnyside, yet acted anyway without basis in law or fact, 
D7HD should be held accountable for the financial burden that Sunnyside has had to bear for correcting 
the mistakes this Department and its Board of Health never should have made. Sunnyside is entitled to 
attorney fees at the administrative, trial court and appellate levels. 
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